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REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SPRING
2011 revolutions in the Arab world sparked strong worldwide interest, mainly due
to the easiness with which long-reigning dictators were renouncing their power. How-
ever, the shift of power did not make those who led to overthrowing the tyrants any
better off. As the price of freedom seems incalculable, it is difficult to assess unequivo-
cally all the costs of the so-called Arab revolutions: the number of people killed and dis-
placed, changes to the size of economies and the standard of living, the impact on both
the nearest neighbours and the situation in the region. Approximately 50,000 people
died in total in the four most violent uprisings in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria where
one of them is still on-going. Yemen’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has decreased by
10% whereas in Libya it has plummeted to levels from the beginning of the 21st century.
At the same time, Egypt and Tunisia have observed a negligible increase. No figures
are available from Syria but estimates say about more than a 10% drop. In the
above-mentioned countries, GDP per capita has not changed since 2010 whereas in
Libya it has dropped by a staggering several dozen percent (in 2010 Libya had one of
the highest GDP per capita in Africa).1 In the 2012 edition of the annual Failed States
Index issued by Foreign Policy, it was Libya and Syria where the most notable decrease
was observed (rank 50th and 23rd respectively) with Yemen “moving up the scale” and
being rated 8th in the world. One of the main issues touched upon in the Failed States
Index 2012 was the Arab Spring in particular, but the picture painted by its authors
turned out to be quite pessimistic and its title: Was the Arab Spring Worth It? does not
leave much room for misinterpretation.2 The purpose of this article is to present the in-
ternational implications of the Arab Spring. Detailed analysis will focus on the regional
context, because the most important changes took place in the the nearest neighbours of
these countries. Firstly, the Arab Spring toppled some myths about the changes in the
region. Secondly, a change of government that took place in the Libya and Egypt,
scared the other leaders in the region. As a result, the rulers undertook measures aimed
at reducing social tensions (budget transfers for the poorest). Thirdly, the intervention
in Libya showed that the West can intervene militarily in its nearest surroundings, when
its interests are threatened.
Each of the countries listed above has gone through changes in their own peculiar
way. The civil war and the strategic defence chosen by Muammar al-Qaddafi claimed
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1 World Economic Outlook Database, 16 July 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2012/01/weodata/index.aspx (24.08.2012).
2 H. Ibish, Was the Arab Spring Worth It?, “Foreign Policy”, July/August 2012.
the highest death toll in Libya. In Egypt, growing political tensions and economic is-
sues affected the average citizens more than clashes between the protesters and the se-
curity forces. Prior to 2011, Yemen had one of the worst economic and social indicators
in the world, deteriorated economy and practically dysfunctional government agencies.
Moreover, the benefits brought about by the protest movement did not yet materialize
in any tangible way. Syria is a completely different story. With the revolution being far
from the end, there are only mounting costs: thousands of people killed, tens of thou-
sands displaced, an economic crash while the benefits are expected to come in a distant
future and only on condition that favourable political changes take place (Bashar
al-Assad stepping aside). With the majority of transformations under way, the onset of
which was marked by the revolutions, it appears that there is no longing for the old
days. Despite months of chaos and violence, no one in Libya feels truly nostalgic about
Muammar al-Qaddafi. The same can be said about Egypt where the memory of Hosni
Mubarak is cherished by very few. A much worse situation is in Yemen where the crisis
continues and it is hard to acknowledge that the change of power will put an end to it.
Although the ongoing civil war in Syria does weaken al-Assad’s regime, the costs of his
downfall, both human and material, are likely to be huge. However, the brutality of the
current regime and repressions directed at the citizens urge the society to think that any-
one will make a better ruler than al-Assad. Nevertheless, in the case of a prolonged war
in Syria, there is already a risk that radical groups will take over at this stage.
Completely different issues are the subject of consideration in the context of the in-
ternational implications of the Arab Spring. At the stage of revolutions themselves, the
countries variously reacted to the unfolding course of events: from astonishment at the
very fact of the outbreak of fightings (Tunisia), through favourable comments (Egypt)
to a military intervention (Libya) and indecisiveness and quarrels (Syria). But only new
governments, elected in a more or less democratic manner, are capable of determining
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the development path of Arabic states and the international community will have to
take an unequivocal stand.
ARAB SPRING. MYTHS AND REALITY
The events of the Arab Spring have reverberated widely, not only in the region, but
also all over the world, disproving on this occasion several prevailing misconceptions
about the Arab world. One of them is a statement that Arabs do not go out on the streets
to protest. Before the protests erupted in Tunisia and Egypt, numerous experts had
claimed that no political reforms had been necessary to execute as there had been no so-
cial need for them. This kind of logic indicated that Arab societies would not demand
any changes and any suggestions for reforms would be perceived as a threat to the pub-
lic interest. However, it transpired that such arguments misfired completely as no one
had envisaged the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. Therefore, it needs to be stated
that no Arabic state is immune to such events (see, the casus of Syria).3 Governments
do not have the luxury of waiting and should not abuse the myth of peace in order to
avoid instigating essential reform processes. Since the events in Tunisia, the states of
the Middle East have allocated vast sums of money for various social programmes,
mainly with the aim to appease the public mood. The largest financial support was de-
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clared by the Saudi Arabia authorities who implemented a 15% salary increase in the
public sector with the final cost of the social programme reaching over $36 milliards.4
Ideas about how to help varied among the countries: free food (Kuwait), additional al-
lowance for each family (Bahrain), tax reductions (Jordan) or minimum wage increase
(Oman).5
Secondly, there was a prevailing conviction that the liberalization of the economy
should precede political reforms. Arabic governments and the representatives of the
Western world alike had believed that liberalization and economic reforms should take
a priority over political changes. The chief argument was that it is more important for
people to satisfy their basic necessities of life. It transpired, however, that the attempts
to liberalize the economy without the system of (democratic) control did not bring
about an improvement in the economic well-being of the majority of the society.6 Since
the benefits of privatization were enjoyed only by political and business elites, the
Arabs had in consequence quite a negative disposition towards economic liberalism
and globalization. It seems quite obvious that economic reforms should occur in paral-
lel to political changes, so that the institutional mechanisms of responsibility could
function and the economic benefits were more widely accessible.7 Another statement
was related to the necessity for the closed (authoritarian) systems to function in order to
prevent Islamists from seizing power. The West feared that democracy would open the
door for extremist political parties to legally come into power and institute radical
changes to their foreign policy. Ruling elites in Arabic states exploited the situation,
creating an impression that they are the only possible alternative to a complete domina-
tion of extreme political forces. It transpired, however, that in spite of constituting
a crucial element of Arabic communities and their political life (so far largely unrepre-
sented), Islamists do not play such a significant role in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. The
claim that the only alternative to authoritarian regimes are Islamic extremists was also
disproved. The protests of Arabic communities in 2011 and 2012 seem to have repelled
corrupt elements, pretence of justice and arbitrary treatment. The participation of
Islamists in the post-revolutionary governments of Tunisia and Egypt shows that it is
possible to create a pluralist system since the majority of Arabic states cannot allow
themselves to be isolated on the international scene and burdened with economic troubles
(the tourist industry is a crucial economic sector for Tunisia and Egypt in particular).8
Prior to the revolution, in order to maintain their domination Arabic leaders had
been proclaiming elections but parliaments (potential governments) created as a result
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4 C. Murphy, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah promises $36 billion in benefits, “The Christian Sci-
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27.02.2011.
5 Arab economies. Throwing money at the street, “The Economist”, 10.03.2011.
6 I. Saif, Economic Reform in Arab Countries and Escaping from the Trap of the ‘Middle Income’
Bracket, “Al-Hayat”, 25.10.2011.
7 M. Mausher, Arab Myths and Realities, The Project Syndicate, 8.03.2011, http://www.pro-
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8 Tunesian Islamist in power. Doing well on parole, “The Economist”, 7.04.2012; S. Hendrix,
For Egypt’s new Islamist government, jobs is first priority, “The Washington Post”, 7 July 2012; and
K. Fahim, New Egyptian Cabinet Includes Many Holdovers, “The New York Times”, 2.08.2012.
of them were weak, unpopular and practically deprived of social support. Elections in
the region were used to create a facade of democracy and legitimize autocratic rulers in
the eyes of the world. The Arab public opinion is no longer capable of tolerating a situa-
tion like that. Instead of cosmetic remodelling of the manner of governing, the society
expects authentic changes that will lead to the enhancement of the economic situation
on the one hand, and a greater participation in ruling (democracy).9 Last but not least,
the final problem refers to the role the international community plays in relation to the
Arab Spring. The United States and other remaining Western countries should support
democratic reforms but not impose certain solutions. President Obama has thrown
aside many of President Bush’s methods which were perceived by the Arab world as at-
tempts to forcefully impose democracy. However, the silence surrounding the sprout-
ing germs of young democracy can result in the fading of the reform process within the
next several years. The West should enter into a discourse with new leaders of the
Arabic countries about political and economic reforms that are being executed. Particu-
larly these aims: increase of openness and separation of powers, should not be sacri-
ficed by the Western leaders.
It is worth mentioning one other aspect of the Arab Spring that has been widely dis-
cussed all over the world – demography. It appears that it is impossible to explain the
origins of the uprisings without pointing to the fact that Arab societies are very young:
individuals less than 30 years old constitute approximately 65% of the population. In
connection with a difficult economic situation (unemployment among young people in
the region is the highest in the world, reaching 25%) it caused growing dissatisfaction
and frustration.10 In this case, new technologies like mobile phones and the Internet
were only the tools that accelerated the occurrence of certain events and facilitated
communication. In addition, young Arabs are becoming increasingly better educated
and knowledgeable about international events than ever before. They were noticing
wealth and freedom enjoyed by the elites of the Arab states and felt angry and disen-
chanted that they are unable to participate in all of that.11
REACTION OF THE ARAB WORLD TO THE CHANGES
The sudden outburst of dissatisfaction in December 2010 (and its subsequent
spreading to the North African states) took most of the observers and Arab govern-
ments alike by surprise. Mohammed Bouazizi’s seemingly accidental act of self-immolation
became a catalyst for change elicited by socio-economic difficulties and political coer-
cion of the Arab people. On one side stood a generation of young people who had been
exposed to the influence of modernising powers (television, Internet, social media);
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No. 4, p. 168–188.
and on the other – oppressive political regimes that were no longer capable of safe-
guarding a better life for that young generation in particular. New media and advanced
communication technologies completely transformed terms of discussion between the
ruling and the ruled, which in consequence led to an utter loss of control over the flow
of information by the governments. Both in Tunisia and Egypt, mobile phones and
Internet-enabled communication connected thousands of people with each other and
provided a platform for the dissemination of information about coming protests, dem-
onstrations and manifestations. We need to remember that political tensions in the Arab
world had already been growing prior to the uprising in Tunisia in the middle of
2010; in Bahrain and Kuwait, local authorities had marginalized political activities of
the opposition, narrowing the field of public discussion over the most important
socio-economic issues. The first state of the Persian Gulf that experienced widespread
protests against the Al-Khalifa royal family was Bahrain (Spring 2011).12 Those pro-
tests, however, were stifled due to an intervention of states forming the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC), namely with the forces of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. Small-scale protests took place in Kuwait, Oman (where security forces
opened fired on protesters in February 2011) and Saudi Arabia (Eastern provinces).
Saudi Arabia’s rulers arrested the founders of the first political party whereas in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) intellectuals calling for political reforms in the emirate
were arrested and sentenced.13
Paradoxically, it was the GCC countries that became the supporters and inspirers of
the intervention in Libya. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, ipso facto, were the first
countries to unequivocally declare support for the Libyan opposition. On the one hand,
it was a sign of “concern” for respecting political rights of the opposition; on the other
hand, which appears more vital, it was dictated by the willingness to play a more signif-
icant role in the regional (or even international) policy. Other reasons for the ambitious
plans of both Qatar and UAE were: diverting attention from their internal problems (the
possibility for unrest to occur within these countries) as well as other, more prestige and
image-related considerations (UAE forces had actively participated in suppressing ri-
ots in Bahrain). Thus, the fact of supporting the Libyan opposition was a clear signal
that GCC regimes were not as conservative and repressive as they would have seemed
and that they were capable of supporting opposition forces in the Arab states. Particular
support for the concept of human rights protection and resolving the conflict in Libya in
the fastest possible way was offered by Qatar. The Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh
Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al Thani, played a leading role in persuading the GCC
countries and the Arab League to establish a no-fly zone over Libya and to recognize
the Libyan National Transitional Council. He also argued that “Qatar will participate in
military action because we believe there must be Arab states undertaking this action,
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because the situation there is intolerable”.14 In conjunction with UAE, Qatar had pro-
vided military and financial aid which became key for the international coalition forces
and the success of the opposition in Libya. Qatari Mirage 2000 jet fighters participated
in the NATO operation in Libya, which at least partially dismissed voices about the in-
tervention by the West (although their role was quite negligible).15 In addition, Qatar
supplied weapons and the Qatari special forces provided the Libyan opposition with
training and operational assistance, which to a large extent contributed to the ultimate
victory of the opposition in Libya.16
Qatar and the UAE alike provided substantial material and logistic support for the
Libyan National Transitional Council. In May 2011, the UAE hosted a meeting at-
tended by the representatives of the Libyan tribes and national groups, and in June 2011
a meeting of the International Contact Group (ICG). Qatar’s non-military aid was esti-
mated to exceed $400 million, comprising water, gas and basic necessities supplies as
well as assistance with selling Libyan oil on the global markets. During the most inten-
sive fights in Benghazi in June 2011, Qatar Petroleum covered most of the energy
needs of the city and the neighbourhood area by supplying petrol and diesel oil. Fur-
thermore, as mentioned above, Qatar was the first state to recognize the Libyan Na-
tional Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan nation and
also a host of the first meeting of the ICG in April 2011.17 Amongst the remaining GCC
states, it was Kuwait who had the greatest input in endorsing the Libyan revolution by
donating $260 million to support the mechanism of financing the Libyan National
Transitional Council and providing both medical and humanitarian aid. Even Saudi
Arabia added Libya to the list of regimes (including Syria and Yemen) for which the
country had withdrawn its political support. It is clear that the changes experienced by
the Arab states considerably affected the safety policy of the main players in the region,
particularly of Saudi Arabia for which the Arab Spring could have had grave conse-
quences in the area of their internal policy. It has to be noted, however, that the events of
2011 provided a perfect opportunity for the GCC countries to change their image of
conservative regimes, although not all of the states took advantage of that in the same
way Qatar did. Nevertheless, actions undertaken by the GCC states showed that in spite
of their intervention in Bahrain, they are capable of maintaining, at least temporarily,
the pretence of control over the societies and reconciling their internal conservative
policy with political and economic reforms.
Following the diplomatic success regarding Libya, Qatari authorities intended to
continue their engagement in resolving the conflict in Syria, even more so because Qa-
tar held rotating leadership of the Arab League in 2011–2012. However, the attempts to
find backing for solving regional problems ended in failure. Emir Sheikh Hamad be-
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came the first Arab leader who in the middle of January 2012 called for military inter-
vention aiming at ending the bloodshed in Syria. His appeal, however, failed to produce
any effect and attracted lesser attention than the Libyan case.18 Even if the Arab states
themselves saw the necessity to reach an agreement over the revolution in Syria, they
did not succeed in the form of the potential intervention itself (initially they had planned
to send observer missions). Yet, the emir of Qatar was determined to perpetuate Qatar’s
role as the responsible and most actively engaged member of the Arab community. It
turned out to be substantially more difficult than it had seemed as the balance of power
in Syria was considerably less attainable and the opposition more divided than in Libya.
Because of that, diplomatic, political as well as economic and media pressure was in-
creased. In February 2012 the Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al-Thani,
publically declared his support for changing the regime and appealed to the interna-
tional community for arming the Syrian opposition and assistance in overthrowing
al-Assad by all possible means (the fact of providing material support to the Syrian op-
position by Qatar and Saudi Arabia was not without significance).19 Due to the small
population and vast oil and gas reserves, Qatar experiences neither socio-economic nor
political pressure from its own citizens as is happening in the other states of North Af-
rica and the Middle East. It transpires that Qatar sees the events of the Arab Spring more
in terms of new prospects that are opening up for itself rather than a challenge. Perhaps
it is about affirming its international reputation, even at the cost of good foreign rela-
tions with some of the Arab states.
One cannot help but notice a competition between Qatar and Saudi Arabia with re-
gard to resolving the Syrian conflict, especially in the light of the fact that the calling of
Qatari authorities for arming the Syrian opposition occurred a few days after a similar
offer had been put forward by Saudi Arabia’s prince Saud al-Faisal. It was also the
Saudi Arabians who were the first to recognize the Syrian National Council as the legit-
imate representative of the Syrian nation and at the non-state level are the biggest
weapon supplier for the Syrian opposition.20 The behaviour of the GCC states towards
Syria is, however, guided by entirely different and somewhat less noble motives. The
protests of public opinion in the Arab countries and positive reactions of the Arab com-
munities to the bloody events in Syria can hardly be applauded. On the other hand, it
has to be noted that vetoing the UNSC draft resolution of 4 February by China and Rus-
sia21 sparked protests in the GCC countries (in Kuwait protesters even gathered in front
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of the Russian Embassy).22 The main motive behind the steps undertaken by Saudi Ara-
bia is to weaken the position of Iran as the regional power and the desire to further iso-
late the regime. Apart from that, there is reluctance from Saudi Arabia rulers towards
Iraqi authorities who are being accused of collaboration with Iran and a concern that the
potential cooperation of Iraq, Iran and Syria could lead to the shift in power in the Mid-
dle East and jeopardize the interests of the USA and Saudi Arabia. The support offered
to the rebels in Syria averts such a possibility and strengthens the position of Saudi Ara-
bia as the major regional power.23
While recapitulating the attitudes of selected Arab states towards the problem of
Libya and Syria, it is impossible to avoid the issue of double standards applied by some
of them in their foreign and security policies. Such double standards are perfectly no-
ticeable in actions undertaken by Saudi Arabia. On 14 March 2011, over 1000 soldiers
of the Saudi Arabia National Guard together with the United Arab Emirates police
contingent marched into Bahrain. Even though they probably did not participate in the
suppression of the pro-democratic opposition, their presence itself was enough to con-
tribute to the collapse of the uprising.24 Yet a few days later, on 19 March, both Saudi
Arabia and Qatar supported international intervention in Libya in order to protect civil-
ians. After all, the Qatari authorities also found themselves in an awkward situation,
especially that the intervention in Bahrain was undertaken on behalf of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council (GCC). The manner in which the changes in the Arab world were com-
mented live by the Al-Jazeera television (broadcasting from Doha), where one could
hear voices of unequivocal support for the uprisings in Libya and Syria, is also evidence
of the degree of complexity of the international situation in the region. However, the
journalists of the station are very restrained and wary in expressing their opinions about
the problems in Bahrain or the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia.25
WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE ARAB SPRING:
NATO INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
There are at least several reasons for the engagement of NATO troops in the protec-
tion of civilians in Libya. First of all, considering al-Qaddafi’s attitude, it was hard to
rely on his voluntary resignation. Adecided advantage of government forces must have
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resulted in the rebels’ defeat and they could not have escaped it without external sup-
port. Second, the social structure itself rooted in the tribal “esprit de corps” created con-
ditions in which the tribes that rebelled against al-Qaddafi were not inclined to cease
their actions until they achieved their primary aim. Needless to say, the revolt of tribal
structures along with the government’s reaction to it (the use of force against the rebels)
led to the outbreak of the civil war. On 12 March 2011 the League of Arab States called
for more radical actions with regard to the situation in Libya whereas on 17 March 2011
the UN Security Council adopted resolution no 1973 of 17 March 2011.26 In the resolu-
tion Libya was denounced for not complying with a previous resolution of 26 February
2011. It was also condemned for attacks on civilians and breaching human rights. The
resolution also stated that actions directed against the people in Libya could be classi-
fied as crimes against humanity. The UNSC’s decision entitled the member states to
take all the necessary measures to protect civilians (military occupation of Libya was,
however, ruled out). The mechanisms leading to the accomplishment of these tasks
were defined in the following way: firstly, by establishing a no-fly zone over the entire
territory of Libya. Secondly, by introducing an embargo on all weapon supplies to
Libya, including defining rules regarding cargo ship inspections. Thirdly, it opened the
way to implementing a forcible solution however limited to establishing a no-fly zone
(and compelling observance of it only) as well as protecting civilians. It is worth adding
that the resolution did not give a mandate to support the offensive of the rebel forces
from the air or engage land forces.27
The military intervention under the code name Odyssey Dawn began on 19 March
2011 and was initially led by a group of states under the leadership of France, Great
Britain and the USA. Despite the fact that it was the Europeans that had mostly insisted
on the armed intervention, it transpired that they did not have sufficient military poten-
tial and greater engagement of the USA was required. However, the Americans an-
nounced from the very beginning that their participation in the mission would be
gradually limited and the responsibility for it handed over to the Europeans). As a result
of the talks, on 27 March 2011 it was decided that the North Atlantic Alliance would
take over the leadership of the operation as a Unified Protector (the decision was put
into effect on 31 March).28 The primary aim of the operation was to force al-Qaddafi to
fulfil UN’s demands. It was eventually to become insufficient as the rebels intended to
topple al-Qaddafi’s regime, which received endorsement of the Arab world in particu-
lar.29 Thus, the termination of intervention was in fact conditional upon the Libyan
leader’s stepping aside, which happened on 20 October 2011, and was a sufficient rea-
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son for NATO to announce the end of its mission.30 The involvement of NATO troops
came to an end on 1 November 2011 with an official termination of the Unified Protec-
tor operation. A few days earlier, on 27 October, the UNSC repealed the resolution of
March 2011.31 The NATO military action can be considered a success not only because
of the end of the civil war in Libya, but mainly due to the fact that it was non-U.S. forces
who played a decisive role in the military operations (with France, Great Britain and
Italy in the lead). In addition, the following Arab countries participated in the operation:
UAE, Qatar, Jordan and Morocco.32
Undoubtedly, the involvement of NATO troops in the conflict resolution in Libya
indeed ended in success if one measures the successfulness of the mission by its effec-
tiveness, i.e. regime change – even though it was not the primary justification of the UN
resolution. Nevertheless, the following conclusions regarding the relations between the
West and the Arab world can be drawn on the basis of the operation in Libya. The legal-
ity of the intervention has to be considered in the first place. The intervention was possi-
ble because of fulfilling three basic conditions: legality (approval of the UNSC),
legitimacy (endorsement of Arab states, including the Arab League) and providing ef-
fectual assistance (weakening of al-Qaddafi’s regime and existence of organized oppo-
sition). It is hard to believe that similar circumstances could occur in the future, which
the conflict in Syria clearly proves; in addition, one has to take into account interests of
other international players, such as Russia and China. Second, the case of Libya will
certainly not become a new war model (conflict resolution). Bombarding regime ar-
mies by NATO air forces in order to protect civilians undoubtedly brought about a de-
sired effect. However, the toppling of the regime and taking over power by the rebels
was only possible thanks to the existence of strong and organized opposition forces. It
appears that if an intervention of land forces (which obviously was not permitted) or
special forces had been required, the conflict in Libya could have transformed into the
“Afghan” model. Third, it seems that the situation from Iraq, let alone Afghanistan, will
not be repeated in Libya. Organized opposition against al-Qaddafi actively operating
for the last few years, relatively insignificant importance of extremist Islamic groups,
little influence of the army (in comparison to Egypt, for instance), revenue yielded from
exporting oil, relatively sparse population and fairly undamaged infrastructure – all
these factors allow us to look to the future with optimism, perhaps even to venture
a view that Libya has every chance to become one of the most developed African states.
Four, the situation in the North Atlantic Alliance became complicated after Germany
and Turkey raised a firm objection against the involvement of NATO in Libya. In fact,
only a small number of European countries were engaged in military operations which
would not have been possible anyway had it not been for the support of the U.S. troops
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present in the Mediterranean region. Last, it is worth considering the role and tasks the
European Union and individual member states could play and perform in the “new”
Libya. On the one hand, one has to notice an essential role of this country in holding
back the wave of international terrorism, issues related to migrations to the European
continent or the safety of supplies of energy resources to the south of Europe. On the
other hand, any form of pressure exerted by European countries on the new government
may result in it distancing itself from the cooperation with Europe. From the onset,
France and Italy have been expressing their interest in developing a close cooperation
regarding economic or energy joint ventures.33
The power shift in Libya also undermined the foundations on which the former co-
operation between the West and the Arab states rested on. Supporting political stability
in North Africa was supposed to resolve the problem of terrorism or migrations to Eu-
rope. However, the belief that the endeavours to attain economic liberalization will lead
to moderating political regimes in North Africa proved to be an unsuccessful strategy
which was challenged by the very citizens of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The rationale
behind the EU policy (or the policy of the individual EU states) to support authoritarian
but secular regimes (in the area of political and economic cooperation) was an attempt
to give protection against radical Islamic groups being, mainly in Egypt, under the re-
gime control. That assumption proved to be wrong as well as the revolutions in Tunisia,
Libya or Egypt had more secular character although Islamic groups did come to power
in Egypt. Even though the European policy towards the North African states generally
needs to be assessed negatively, elaborating a new vision of policy related to this region
will require completely different rules, assumptions and goals. Therefore, both the Eu-
ropean Union’s policy and its instruments used with regard to the states of the region of
North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) have to undergo a fundamental change.
A step in the right direction is to come up with and define new priorities for assistance
based on four pillars: conditionality, differentiation among the states, support of de-
mocracy and emphasis on sustainable socio-economic development. The new policy is
supposed to be forged under the banner: more money, more access to the market and
more mobility, and its primary aim is to conclude the so-called Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Among the new EU initiatives, one can mention
the SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth)
where about _0length350 million has been allocated for the states of the North African region
whereas in years 2011–2013 within the framework of the European Neighbourhood
Policy Instrument Tunisia and Egypt have been allocated _0length160 and _0length450 million re-
spectively. Curiously enough, poor results yielded by previous programmes have cer-
tainly led to the resignation from rigidly laid down conditions for providing assistance
and instead of putting forward a list of terms and conditions that the help-seeking coun-
tries should satisfy, the European Commission is suggesting a more lenient approach
that involves a process of mutual listening (listening mode). The purpose of such be-
haviour is to draw the Arab countries into cooperation with the EU whereas a relaxation
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of procedures for providing assistance is aimed at encouraging partners to not give up
efforts in favour of political and economic reforms.34
* * *
While attempting to perform an evaluation of the events in the Arab world, initiated
by Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December 2010, it is impossible to detach
ourselves from the European perspective we adopt in order to assess political, social
and economic changes. Certainly, it is difficult to be an impartial observer in a situation
like that; however, it appears that the policy of the European countries regarding the
Arab world was totally misguided. The supporting efforts provided by the European
politicians to the regimes of Libya or Egypt proved to be myopic. The policy of Western
partners was closely related to their belief that authoritarian regimes would secure cer-
tainty, stability and predictability, which would directly translate into good relations,
both economic (supplies of energy resources from Libya) and political (the president of
Egypt was perceived as a sufficient guarantee against Islamic extremism). It transpired,
however, that the policy had weak foundations and the Western European politicians
misconstrued the intentions of the Arab communities. The overthrow of president Ben
Ali left the Western world utterly perplexed, in the same manner as the course of the
revolution in Egypt did. It was in Libya where the West finally intervened. Yet the situa-
tion in Syria proves again to surpass the capabilities of collaboration amongst the lead-
ing global policy powers. Reservations of China and Russia, or rather their own
interests, are the main stumbling blocks in the way of reaching an agreement over the
conflict termination in Syria.
The situation in the Arab world is dynamic, and changes have not been completed. It
is particularly relevant to the situation in Egypt where the society is dissatisfied with
president Mursi’s other authoritarian moves. Moreover, the underlying causes of the
Arab revolutions, namely unemployment, corruption, lack of prospects for young gen-
erations, or unequal re-distribution of GDPare still largely unresolved. Changes, partic-
ularly in the North African states, appear to be a great opportunity for the European
Union. More importantly, however, EU authorities are making an effort to notice the
problem and are no longer as restrictive and uncompromising when assisting other
countries of the region. It will be of paramount importance for the future of the Euro-
pean Union itself and its closest neighbouring countries.
ABSTRACT
2012 revolutions in the Arab world sparked strong worldwide interest, mainly due to the eas-
iness with which long-reigning dictators were renouncing their power. However, the shift of
power did not make those who led to overthrowing the tyrants any better off. As the price of free-
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dom seems incalculable, it is difficult to assess unequivocally all the costs of the so-called Arab
revolutions: the number of people killed and displaced, changes to the size of economies and the
standard of living, the impact on both the nearest neighbours and the situation in the region. The
purpose of this article is to present the international implications of the Arab Spring. Detailed
analysis will focus on the regional context, because the most important changes took place in
the the nearest neighbours of these countries. Firstly, the Arab Spring toppled some myths
about the changes in the region. Secondly, a change of government that took place in the Libya
and Egypt, scared the other leaders in the region. As a result, the rulers undertook measures
aimed at reducing social tensions (budget transfers for the poorest). Thirdly, the intervention
in Libya showed that the West can intervene militarily in its nearest surroundings, when its in-
terests are threatened.
ARABSKA WIOSNA – REGIONALNE IMPLIKACJE
STRESZCZENIE
Rewolucje w œwiecie arabskim wzbudza³y ogromne zainteresowanie na ca³ym œwiecie,
g³ównie z powodu ³atwoœci, z jak¹ panuj¹cy od lat dyktatorzy oddawali w³adzê. Jednak zmiana
w³adzy nie oznacza³a faktycznej poprawy bytu ludzi, którzy doprowadzili do upadku tyranów.
Cena wolnoœci wydaje siê byæ niepoliczalna, trudno wiêc jednoznacznie oszacowaæ wszystkie
koszty tzw. arabskich rewolucji: iloœæ zabitych i wysiedlonych, zmiany wielkoœci gospodarek
i poziomu ¿ycia, wp³yw na najbli¿szych s¹siadów i sytuacjê w regionie. Celem artyku³u jest
przedstawienie miêdzynarodowych implikacji arabskiej wiosny. Przedmiotem szczegó³owej
analizy bêdzie jednak kontekst regionalny, poniewa¿ konsekwencje arabskiej wiosny w³aœnie
w najbli¿szym otoczeniu Tunezji, Libii i Egiptu spowodowa³y najwiêksze zmiany. Po pierwsze,
arabska wiosna obali³a pewne mity dotycz¹ce zmian w pañstwach regionu. Po drugie, sposób
zmiany w³adzy, przestraszy³ pozosta³ych przywódców w regionie, co spowodowa³o pewne kro-
ki z ich strony (polegaj¹ce g³ównie na ³agodzeniu napiêæ spo³ecznych). Po trzecie, interwencja
w Libii pokaza³a, ¿e Zachód jest w stanie interweniowaæ zbrojnie w swoim najbli¿szym otocze-
niu, gdy zagro¿one s¹ jego interesy.
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